As the Covid-19 pandemic struck, many healthcare providers switched to telemedicine to deliver medical care through computer and phone screens. How can historians make sense of this use of technolo...

Is Jean-Paul Sartre to be credited for Richard Wright's existentialist leanings? This essay argues that while there have been noteworthy philosophical exchanges between Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Richard Wright, we can find evidence of Wright's philosophical and existential leanings before his interactions with Sartre and Beauvoir. In particular, Wright's short story "The Man Who Lived Underground" is analyzed as an existential, or Black existential, project that is published before Wright met Sartre and/or read his scholarship. Existentialist themes (...) that emerge from Wright's short story include flight, guilt, life, death, dread, and freedom. Additionally, it is argued that "The Man Who Lived Underground" offers a reversal of the prototypical allegory of the cave that we find in the Western (ancient Greek) philosophical tradition. The essay takes seriously the significance of the intellectual exchanges between Sartre, Beauvoir, and Wright while also highlighting Wright's own philosophical legacy. (shrink)

There was once a man in a certain village in the mountains, who made his living by making up stories, which he used to tell to the people of his village to while away their evenings. One day he went on a journey to a strange village far away in the plains, and there he saw a group of men sitting round another story-teller. Being curious to learn whether his rival was as good a story-teller as he was, (...) he joined the group and listened. He was astonished to find that the story being told was one he had made up himself. So when the story-teller had finished, the man took him aside and said, ‘That was a good story, but it is my story, which I made up, and you must pay me money for it.’ ‘You are wrong,’ said his rival. ‘It is my story, for I made it up myself this morning’. (shrink)

There was once a man in a certain village in the mountains, who made his living by making up stories, which he used to tell to the people of his village to while away their evenings. One day he went on a journey to a strange village far away in the plains, and there he saw a group of men sitting round another story-teller. Being curious to learn whether his rival was as good a story-teller as he was, (...) he joined the group and listened. He was astonished to find that the story being told was one he had made up himself. So when the story-teller had finished, the man took him aside and said, ‘That was a good story, but it is my story, which I made up, and you must pay me money for it.’ ‘You are wrong,’ said his rival. ‘It is my story, for I made it up myself this morning’. (shrink)

Thus Pascal sets forth the romanticist thesis that reason has nothing to do with the deep intimations of the worshipping soul. Religion is an affair of the heart, and the productive Source of all things cannot be comprehended by the exercise of the finite intellect. This doctrine foreshadows the Kantian dichotomy between phenomena and noumena: the understanding can legitimately operate only within the sphere of space, time and natural causality, as it knows nothing of the transcendental postulates of the moral (...) life. In Kant's case, however, the opposition is worked out by means of a sustained and systematic analysis of man's faculties of cognition, and the intuitions of moral feeling are not without a rationality of their own. One might say that in Kant's view there is a logic of ethical sentiment as well as a logic of the scientific understanding, the former being practical, the latter theoretical. In the practical domain of morality the categories of the scientific understanding do not apply: the individual who acts from a sense of duty is free and immortal, besides being destined to receive rewards from the hand of God according to his deserts. The practice of the moral life therefore creates a sort of categoreal vacuum, the individual becoming a noumenon, emancipated from the shackles of the sensible world; from an empirical point of view, morality means self-transcendence. (shrink)

A common and enduring early modern intuition is that materialists reduce organisms in general and human beings in particular to automata. Wasn’t a famous book of the time entitled L’Homme-Machine? In fact, the machine is employed as an analogy, and there was a specifically materialist form of embodiment, in which the body is not reduced to an inanimate machine, but is conceived as an affective, flesh-and-blood entity. We discuss how mechanist and vitalist models of organism exist in a more (...) complementary relation than hitherto imagined, with conceptions of embodiment resulting from experimental physiology. From La Mettrie to Bernard, mechanism, body and embodiment are constantly overlapping, modifying and overdetermining one another; embodiment came to be scientifically addressed under the successive figures of vie organique and then milieu intérieur, thereby overcoming the often lamented divide between scientific image and living experience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 265 concluding chapter (pp. 150-52), Dr. Clair deals with "Comment lire l'oeuvre du P. Thomassin," providing much guidance to anyone who wishes to avail himself of the rich resources in Thomassin's writings. From the point of view of the history of philosophy, the most interesting aspects of Thomassin's thought seem to be (1) his "Cartesianism," that is, the extent to which he early imbibed Descartes' new ideas, (...) and played a role in the fusion of the views of Augustine, B6rulle, and Descartes that developed in the Oratory, (2) his attempt to find a viable theory of the nature of Grace somewhere between Arnauld and Malebranche, and (3) his efforts to formulate a philosophy of history within an Augustinian theology; a philosophy of history that would make historical research and understanding of genuine philosophical and religious value to man. Dr. Clair's too brief discussions indicate that Thomassin was definitely influenced by reading Descartes, but also that Thomassin was much too eclectic to be a Cartesian. With regard to the problem of Grace, where the Cartesian Arnauld fought with the semi-Cartesian Malebranche, Thomassin tried deftly to maintain an Augustinian position that was not quite as rigid as that of the Jansenists, nor as moderate as that of Malebranche (though Arnauld tried to use Thomassin's erudition and authority in his battles with Malebranche). Unfortunately Dr. Clair does not try to evaluate whether Thomassin really found a coherent and theologically acceptable middle-ground between the two antagonists. On the subject of the philosophy of history, Thomassin's views seem most interesting (at least to this reviewer). The short text that Dr. Clair includes on the difference of history from science reveals Thomassin trying to show that the investigation and comprehension of temporal particulars can have significant value for man's understanding of man and that there can be genuine certainty about past facts. Thomassin was writing in the period when modern historical method and outlook were born, when historical study changed from chronicles and ammunition in theological and political disputes to a basic way of understanding human nature. Those concerned with the role of Bayle, Hume, Gibbon, and Vico in developing an historical methodology and a rationale for art historical approach to human problems might well profit from considering Thomassin's writings in this area, and the influence they had on modern historiography and philosophies of history. Dr. Clair's short work certainly helps in filling a lacuna in our picture of the seventeenth century. It also makes one wish he had done more, and had provided a "complete" study of Thomassin's thought and influence. That, perhaps, is one of the major purposes of this new series, in that it will lead scholars to looking into the more hidden portions of the period, and will lead them to filling out in more detail and depth the history of the rise and fall of modern philosophy. It is to be hoped that future volumes in this series will continue to whet our appetites for further investigations, and will transform more of the names we run across into figures about whom we have some information and from whom we can still learn something. RICHARD H. POPKIN University of California, San Diego Berkeley's Theory of Vision..4 Critical Examination of Bishop Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. By D. M. Armstrong. (Melbourne: University Press; London and N. Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1960. Pp. viii + 106. $4.50). Berkeley's brilliant though disconcerting Essay has been rather neglected for some time, except for the able studies of C. M. Turbayne of Rochester University (N. Y.). Armstrong's book is welcome for that reason, also for its freshness, clearness, and rich brevity. A1- 266 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY though a slim volume, it is packed with close yet lucid argumentation, conducted throughout with good manners, and throughout exploratory, clarifying problems, exposing logical and empirical difficulties, not grandly telling us what the truth is but leaving us in a better position to carry on the exploration ourselves. It is an exemplary piece of philosophical discussion. He clears his ground by noting that the Essay, so far as... (shrink)

Ṣāliḥ Nābī (d. 1914) is a person who lived in the last periods of the Ottomans and is a medical graduate and interested in Turkish music. In 1910, he received a work called al-Falsafa al-Mūsiḳī (Philosophy of Musica). In this study, the effects of music on the human soul, music history, and musical understanding in the Ottoman period were found. Throughout history, many musical compositions have been received and reflected some philosophical thoughts. But an independent study of philosophy and music (...) is not found before the 20th century. For this reason, Ṣāliḥ Nābī's al-Falsafa al-Mūsiḳī work is remarkable in terms of its title. There are brief explanations about various issues in the work but the most important issue that attracts our opinion is the musical perception of the period. Because Ṣāliḥ Nābī, as a witness at that time, thinks that music has been neglected for a long time in the Ottoman Empire. This is the reason why he has already taken him to a work. In this article, it has been tried to be given to today's musical literalism. Summary: Ṣāliḥ Nābī was born on May 5, 1886, in Istanbul Yedikule. After his primary and secondary education, he started the Military Medicine Faculty in Cengelkoy on March 13, 1901. He graduated in 1911 after having studied for a total of ten years here. Prior to his graduation he worked as assistant at Bel-Air Hospital in Switzerland for a while. He died at the age of twenty-eight in 1914 after having practiced medicine in several different regions.Ṣāliḥ Nābī, who died at a young age, has two works that arrive present days. One of them is the graduation thesis named Mental Illnesses and Bel-Air Hospital in the Twentieth Century. In this work that he published in 1911, he made suggestions about the architectural works to be done in this area by making use of some of the examinations in Switzerland Bel-Air Bâmârhânesi where he served as an assistant for a while. The other work, which is also the subject of our work, is named al-Falsafa al-Mūsiḳī(Philosophy of Musica).Al-Falsafa al-Mūsiḳīis composed of thirty-two pages. The first fascicle, which is the subject of our work, is the only known number of this work that planned to be published as monthly magazines. This work is written to explain the subjects of music and philosophy. But this work could not continue because of Ṣāliḥ Nābī’s participation in the Balkan Wars after his graduation and later his death at a young age. Al-Falsafa al-Mūsiḳīconsists of three parts, one of which is the introduction part. Under the heading entitled "Medhal", the cultural and musical environment of the Ottomans in those days is mentioned and the purpose of writing the work is explained. The second part is about the musical influences on soul. This section examines the following topics: Musical influence on soul, the importance and service of the ancient Greeks to music, some notes about music in history. The name of the last part is “Mūsiḳīnin İctimā’iyāt ve Tārihle Munāsebeti (Relation of Music with Sociology and History)”. Under the last title these subjects are respectively discussed: the place of music in social life, the origins of music, the invention of some instruments used by the ancient Greeks, especially the "lyric", the services of the ancient Greeks as music, the development of music in the Arab world and its pioneers, the effect of the invention and dissemination of musical notation.As you can see, although the author uses “music” and “philosophia” words in the name of work, he has made statements on many issues. We will examine these issues under five headings in terms of better understanding of the work and on the subject matter integrity. These are: The origin of the word of “al-Mūsiḳī/music”, the musical thought in the work, the history of music, the musical understanding and works in the Ottoman in the twentieth century and the music-literature relation. Since the topics under these headings will be given in detail in the article, we can summarize them briefly as follows. There is some information in the sources of musicology that the origin of the word of “al-Mūsiḳī/music” is derived from the ancient Greeks. According to this idea, word of “al-Mūsiḳī/music” comes from “musa” which is the goddess of poetry and music. But Ṣāliḥ Nābī did not accept this claim. The author states that this word is used to be by the ancient Greeks, but also existed long before them. Moreover, Sālih Nâbî states that such thoughts arise as a result of a mistake such as searching for the origin of everything in the ancient Greeks. Ṣāliḥ Nābī states that music is art that can express the deepest feelings of the soul. This is the humane direction of music. On the social side, music is the most important means of revealing the structure of a society and the world of thought. For this reason, the development of music shows the development of the country. Therefore, music is important in child bringing-up and in the first education period of a child. Because the generation who knows the music, senses the deepest feeling of the soul (which is the conscience, they also have moral norms that are socially necessary. There are some explanations of music history in the work of Ṣāliḥ Nābī. The author bases musical history before the creation of Adam. Because the voice was there before man was created. The works of the ancient Greeks in the history of music cannot be denied. They have reached important information on issues such as instrument inventions, influence of music on soul, the fact that music becomes a science, and they have conveyed them to future generations with their works. The author, who stated that similar works were done in the world of Islam, gives two examples with the mention of Fārābī and Ibrāhīm al-Mavsilī. One of the issues that the author is talking about is the influence of music on soul. Ṣāliḥ Nābī is a doctor interested in music. He had also done research on this subject, prepared a thesis as mentioned before, and published his work. The author, explaining this effect of music, has given examples in the history that some wars have been gained thanks to music.One of the most remarkable parts of the work of Ṣāliḥ Nābī is that he analysed the situation of the Ottoman Empire at that time. The author criticizes the current rulings for their indifference to Turkish music. Moreover, he expresses that they are trying to dig root of Turkish music for a while. During this period, a disconnection between the Ottoman palace and the people has begun. Because in the Ottoman palace music is considered to be an elite art and the pleasures of the people are ignored. The author, describing this negative situation, states that despite all of this, there is a correction in the current state of Turkish music in its period. Now the Ottoman palace was not indifferent to Turkish music. In addition, some theoretical studies about Turkish music have begun to emerge in the Ottoman Empire.The author, who also deals with the relationship between music and literature, expresses that these two fields are very close to each other. Therefore, a good poet should know music and a good musician should know literature. (shrink)

The object of this article is to ascertain as nearly as possible the dates of the conference at Luca and of Cicero's speech on the consular provinces; to identify the composition which he called his ‘palinode’; and to fix the chronological order of certain letters which relate to these points. Writing on April 8, 698 , Cicero tells his brother that on the 5th there was a debate in the Senate on the Campanian land; that on the 7th he (...) visited Pompey, who intended to start on the IIth for Sardinia and to embark at Labro or Pisa; and that he himself is on the point of leaving Rome, but intends, after staying successively at Anagnia, Arpinum, Pompeii, and Cumae, to return on May 6. Two years later he wrote to Lentulus Spinther that in the debate of April 5, 56, it had been resolved ‘that the question of the Campanian land should be referred to a full meeting of the Senate on the 15th of May.’ ‘After this decree,’ he continued, had passed in accordance with my motion, Pompey, without showing the least sign of being offended with me, started for Sardinia and Africa, and on the way visited Caesar at Luca. Caesar complained a great deal about my motion, for he had already seen Crassus at Ravenna, and had been irritated by him against me. Everyone knew that Pompey was much annoyed about it—so I heard from others and afterwards learned definitely from my brother. When Pompey met him in Sardinia a few days after he left Luca, he said, “You are the very man I want to see… You went bail for your brother Marcus; unless you speak strongly to him, you'll have to pay up”… He spoke of his own services to me; recalled what he had often said to my brother about Caesar's measures [in his consulship] and the pledge which my brother had given for my conduct; called my brother to witness that what he had done to secure my recall [from exile] he had done with the consent of Caesar; and asked him to commend to me Caesar's policy and aims and persuade me not to attack, even if I would not or could not support them. (shrink)

In the Qurʾān, the night which encompass half of human life, is expressed by various concepts. From sunset to sunrise (night), various moments of the time frame are also named with different words and concepts. On the other hand, besides sleep and rest, some worship and actions that are asked to be done at night are also mentioned in the Qur’ānic verses. Also sleep at night and the night itself is mentioned as a proof of Allah and an important blessing (...) for us. When we say “night”, people first think of sleep and rest. However, as it is understood from the Qur’ānic verses, the night should not be seen only as a sleep time and rest time. Such that one of the first commandments to the Prophet Muḥammad was to wake up at night and perform various worship and deeds. Also, it is emphasized in the Qurʾān that night worship and actions influence and leave permanent impacts on human being. In this context, in this study, we tried to identify the concepts and expressions stated in the Qurʾān expressing the night-time or the time slices in it by taking into account the references in the Qur’ānic verses. Moreover, we have also examined worship and actions performed or recommended to do at night. Again, we have researched how the worship and actions performed in the calm and darkness of the night will contribute to human being. Thus, we tried to determine how the Qurʾān addresses the "night" which is the preparation time for the next day and the assessment time of the previous day.Summary: One lives half of his life during the day and the other half at night. However, he plans his daily tasks mostly according to daytime, and spends his nights mostly for sleep and rest. On the other hand, sparing the night completely for sleep and rest means that a long period of life passes passively by. That is why we have decided to do a night-time study that expresses an important time frame for human being. Although there are some ḥadīth about the importance of night worship in the sources, we tried to conduct our research within the framework of the Qur’ānic verses about the night. To determine the meaning and the importance attributed to the night by the Qurʾān, we have examined the Qur’ānic verses referring to night-time, night events and worship and actions that are desired to be done during these times. We concluded our research by making use of the main sources of tafsīr and relevant copyrighted works, articles, papers and encyclopedia articles.During the research we saw that the Qurʾān refers to the night and some time periods in it with different names. In this context, we see that concepts such as leyl (ليل), beyāt (بيات), fajr (فجر), seḥar (سحر), ğāsik (غاسق), ʿashiyy (عشيّ) and asīl (أصيل) are used in the āya. In many Qur’ānic verses, phrases reffering an entire day with specific composition such as day-night and morning-evening are used. In the composition of day and night, night is always mentioned first. In the compositions in the form of morning-evening, we see that sometimes the morning is mentioned first, and sometimes the evening. In addition to these, there are expressions such as before the sunrise, sunset, stay until evening that evokes night-time in the Qurʾān.Another point that draws attention in the research is that there are vows on the night or on certain times in the night in the Qurʾān. We can say that the vows in question are an indication of the importance that Allah gives to the night and some time in it. In fact, Allah points to the night, the functions of the night and its relationship with the day as a āyah (proof) of his existence, might and uniqueness.On the other hand, there are many good and bad historical events that happened during the night in the Qurʾān. First of all, it should be noted that the beginning of the waḥy (devine revalation), which is one of the biggest historical events, took place at night. The Qurʾān describes this night, which is mentioned as Laylat al-Qadr, as better than a thousand months. Again, it is mentioned in the Qurʾānic verses that Prophet Moses and Lūṭ left their countries by taking advantage of the darkness of the night with the believers to get rid of the evil of the oppressors. Also, deniers sometimes chose especially the night-time to carry out cheats and traps for the prophets and believers, and even attempts to assassinate. The fact that the night is dark, quiet and calm obsufucates such negative actions. For this reason, the Qurʾān recommended to take refuge in the Lord of the daybreak from the evil of the darkness.The research demonstrates that the Qurʾān asks people to perform various worships and actions in certain time periods of the night. In fact, even in the early days of waḥy, the Prophet was commanded to wake up at night and perform some worship and actions. In this context, he was asked to pray at night, read the Qurʾān by contemplating and understanding, and chant the name of his Lord. Actually, the Prophet is prepared for the heavy responsibility he took spiritually with such actions that he performed at night. Because a strong spirit and mind are necessary for facing up to what will happen during the next day. It is already stated in the Qurʾān that getting up at night has effective and permanent effects on people. Again, during the prophethood, The Prophet has advised to perform some actions such as sajdah (prostration), qiyām, tasbīḥ and tahajjud ṣalāt (night prayer) -as a special night prayer- during the night.In the Qurʾānic verses examined, some prayers and actions are asked to do at night and day regardless of time. Especially three of the farḍ of prayer (ṣalāt), namely evening, ʿišāʾ and fajr prayer (ṣalāt), are performed during the time defined as night. In addition, some aspects such as duʿāʾ (prayer), istighfār (ask for forgiveness), ṣadaqa and daʿwah (call) are mentioned in the Qurʾānic verses. It is an order or recommendation that all this be done at night as well as during the day. Especially for istighfār which means to ask for forgiveness, it is mentioned the time of dawning.As a result, we can say that there are some special features that make the night different from daytime. For instance, it prepares a suitable environment to sleep and rest for one who is tired mentally, spiritually and physically after the daytime; as the night has features such as darkness, silence and tranquility that man needs to rest and be calm. On the other hand, Allah does not want the night, which means half of human life, to be spent entirely with sleep and rest. As, one rests not only his body but also his mind and soul in the quiet and calm atmosphere of the night, Hereby, human-being starts the next day with a more vigorous mind, spirit and body. At night-time, while making an evaluation of the previous day's deeds and actions, people are also prepared spiritually and mentally for the next day's works.We can say that worship and deeds performed at night are more sincere than those performed during daytime, because man stays alone with his nafs and his Lord at night, away from the eyes. This can keep people away from riyā (pretension) and vanity that invalidates their deeds. Man's waking up and worshiping his Lord at a time when everyone is asleep shows his ikhlāṣ and sincerity. All these indicate that the time of responsibility for man is not limited to daytime. For this reason, people should think day and night together within the framework of his responsibilities and do their work accordingly. (shrink)

Suppose a certain man, Dion, has his foot amputated, and lives to tell the tale. That tale involves a well-known metaphysical puzzle, for most of us assume that there was, before the operation, an object made up of all of Dion’s parts except those that overlapped with his foot-- ”all of Dion except for his foot”, we might say, or Dion’s “foot-complement”. Call that object Theon. (Anyone who doubts that there is such a thing as Dion’s undetached foot-complement (...) may imagine that ‘Theon’ is a name for Dion’s undetached head. Surely there is such a thing as Dion’s head? And surely Dion could, in principle, survive if his head were detached from the rest of him and kept alive?) It seems obvious that Theon, like Dion, continues to exist after the operation, for you cannot destroy an object merely by changing its surroundings--merely by removing something that was never a part of it. The puzzle, then (which might be called the problem of undetached parts), is how Dion and Theon are related after the operation. The most common answer to this question is that Dion and Theon come to occupy just the same region of space and to be made of just the same matter after the operation. The next-mostpopular answer is that Dion and Theon are made up of temporal parts, and while those of their temporal parts that “occur” before the operation only partly overlap, Dion and Theon have the very same post-operative temporal parts. Much as two roads can merge and have spatial parts in common, Dion and Theon merge and have temporal parts in common. Less popular accounts of the relation between Dion and Theon involve relativizing identity to concepts or times, and denying that there is such a thing as Theon. Michael Burke has recently proposed an intriguing new solution (or resurrected an ancient one) to the problem of undetached parts. [1] He argues that, despite appearances, Theon-- Dion’s foot-complement--ceases to exist when Dion’s foot is removed.. (shrink)

A mammoth labor, this work offers us for the first time in a definitive English edition those notes grouped together and published in 1901 by Nietzsche's sister under the title, Der Wille zur Macht. In his Introduction Kaufmann disputes with good reason Karl Schlechta's claim that "The Will to Power contains nothing new, nothing that could surprise anyone who knows everything Nietzsche published." There are many new things in this work—of particular interest are the discussion of European nihilism in (...) Book One and the "Critique of the 'Good Man'" in Book Two. In addition to an illuminating introduction, there are eight pages of facsimile manuscripts.—J. T. (shrink)

A mammoth labor, this work offers us for the first time in a definitive English edition those notes grouped together and published in 1901 by Nietzsche's sister under the title, Der Wille zur Macht. In his Introduction Kaufmann disputes with good reason Karl Schlechta's claim that "The Will to Power contains nothing new, nothing that could surprise anyone who knows everything Nietzsche published." There are many new things in this work—of particular interest are the discussion of European nihilism in (...) Book One and the "Critique of the 'Good Man'" in Book Two. In addition to an illuminating introduction, there are eight pages of facsimile manuscripts.—J. T. (shrink)

LOYALTY HAS NOT HAD A BAD PRESS, but, as far as Anglo-Saxon philosophy is concerned, very little press. It has merited entries in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics and the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and a short one in Macquarrie's A Dictionary of Christian Ethics. Of course, there is also Josiah Royce's The Philosophy of Loyalty. I propose to argue that these discussions of loyalty tend to assimilate it to faithfulness to a promise, and so omit what is distinctive (...) of it. I shall also argue that the likely reason for this distortion is the modern view of man as a self-defining subject who has autonomously to invent his own law or way, for the universe presents none to him. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 265 concluding chapter (pp. 150-52), Dr. Clair deals with "Comment lire l'oeuvre du P. Thomassin," providing much guidance to anyone who wishes to avail himself of the rich resources in Thomassin's writings. From the point of view of the history of philosophy, the most interesting aspects of Thomassin's thought seem to be (1) his "Cartesianism," that is, the extent to which he early imbibed Descartes' new ideas, (...) and played a role in the fusion of the views of Augustine, B6rulle, and Descartes that developed in the Oratory, (2) his attempt to find a viable theory of the nature of Grace somewhere between Arnauld and Malebranche, and (3) his efforts to formulate a philosophy of history within an Augustinian theology; a philosophy of history that would make historical research and understanding of genuine philosophical and religious value to man. Dr. Clair's too brief discussions indicate that Thomassin was definitely influenced by reading Descartes, but also that Thomassin was much too eclectic to be a Cartesian. With regard to the problem of Grace, where the Cartesian Arnauld fought with the semi-Cartesian Malebranche, Thomassin tried deftly to maintain an Augustinian position that was not quite as rigid as that of the Jansenists, nor as moderate as that of Malebranche (though Arnauld tried to use Thomassin's erudition and authority in his battles with Malebranche). Unfortunately Dr. Clair does not try to evaluate whether Thomassin really found a coherent and theologically acceptable middle-ground between the two antagonists. On the subject of the philosophy of history, Thomassin's views seem most interesting (at least to this reviewer). The short text that Dr. Clair includes on the difference of history from science reveals Thomassin trying to show that the investigation and comprehension of temporal particulars can have significant value for man's understanding of man and that there can be genuine certainty about past facts. Thomassin was writing in the period when modern historical method and outlook were born, when historical study changed from chronicles and ammunition in theological and political disputes to a basic way of understanding human nature. Those concerned with the role of Bayle, Hume, Gibbon, and Vico in developing an historical methodology and a rationale for art historical approach to human problems might well profit from considering Thomassin's writings in this area, and the influence they had on modern historiography and philosophies of history. Dr. Clair's short work certainly helps in filling a lacuna in our picture of the seventeenth century. It also makes one wish he had done more, and had provided a "complete" study of Thomassin's thought and influence. That, perhaps, is one of the major purposes of this new series, in that it will lead scholars to looking into the more hidden portions of the period, and will lead them to filling out in more detail and depth the history of the rise and fall of modern philosophy. It is to be hoped that future volumes in this series will continue to whet our appetites for further investigations, and will transform more of the names we run across into figures about whom we have some information and from whom we can still learn something. RICHARD H. POPKIN University of California, San Diego Berkeley's Theory of Vision..4 Critical Examination of Bishop Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. By D. M. Armstrong. (Melbourne: University Press; London and N. Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1960. Pp. viii + 106. $4.50). Berkeley's brilliant though disconcerting Essay has been rather neglected for some time, except for the able studies of C. M. Turbayne of Rochester University (N. Y.). Armstrong's book is welcome for that reason, also for its freshness, clearness, and rich brevity. A1- 266 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY though a slim volume, it is packed with close yet lucid argumentation, conducted throughout with good manners, and throughout exploratory, clarifying problems, exposing logical and empirical difficulties, not grandly telling us what the truth is but leaving us in a better position to carry on the exploration ourselves. It is an exemplary piece of philosophical discussion. He clears his ground by noting that the Essay, so far as... (shrink)

The main idea of the transhumanist movement is the creation of a new technological human species and the ability to overcome the existing limits of human development imposed by biological heritage. The use of new technologies in human life will change both the natural side of human life and social. The transhumanist evolution of man actualizes and opens up the problems of society related to human interaction. The aim of the article is socio-philosophical review of forecasts and probable consequences of (...) the implementation transhumanist ideas in human life. Research methods are comprehensive and based on philosophicalanthropological and philosophical-cultural analysis of transhumanist concepts of building a transsociety. Discussion. There are many ethical, social, cultural, philosophical and scientific issues that need to be studied and considered in detail.Transhumanists’ calls for radical human change raise fears that man will eventually lose his unique nature. The call for the complete modernization of man is certainly bold, but transhumanism will not go far if it is too shocking and unconventional. However, transhumanists agree that the existence of a society of transhumans requires the introduction of new norms and rules of life. Transhumanists believe that we can talk about improving the situation of humanity if the situation of specific people has improved. And only a person can judge what is good for him or her. Therefore, transhumanists value the personal freedoms and rights of those who want to use technology to expand their mental and physical capabilities and increase control over their own lives. Finally, the ideas of transhumanism do not pose a danger to social development. They are only the basis for building a better society with responsibility to use technological advances. (shrink)

The fundamental message of Jewish thought in Levinas' version can be summarized by the following quote: It ties the meaning of all experiences to the ethical relation among humans; it appears to the personal responsibility of man, who, thereby, knows himself irreplaceable to realize a human society in which humans treat one another as humans. This realization of the just society is ipso facto an elevation of man to the society with God. This society is human happiness itself and the (...) meaning of life. Therefore, to say that the meaning of the real must be understood in function of ethics, is to say that the universe is sacred. But it is sacred in an ethical sense. Ethics is an optics of the divine. No relation to God is more right or more immediate.The Divine cannot manifest itself except through the neighbor. For a Jew, incarnation is neither possible, nor necessary. After all, Jeremiah himself said it: ‘To judge the case of the poor and the miserable, is not that to know me? says the Eternal’. DL 209. The quote at the end is from Jerem. 22:16.The One who is revealed in this ethical religion differs greatly from the almighty and triumphant God whose image dominates any thought in which politics procures the highest perspective. The ‘Master of the world’ is power-less against human violence and sin, vulnerable and persecuted. His passing by is not in the thunderstorm, not in the earthquake, and not in the fire either, but ‘after the fire there was a voice of subtle silence’ (1 Kings 19:11–12). God penetrates the world almost imperceptibly, in extreme humility. AV 211–212 (ECED). Cf. Kierkegaard vivant (Paris: Gallimard 1966), pp. 286–288. (shrink)

The introductory ode of Horace's fourth book has been given comparatively little critical attention, although it might have been expected to arouse exceptional interest, being the first-fruits of the lyricist's autumnal harvest. The neglect is due partly to the poem's deceptive simplicity but much more to the unease which it arouses in Horace's admirers: Venus does not seem the most fitting deity for the poet laureate to invoke, and moreover this is not so much an invocation as an appeal to (...) be left alone; the young man who is the subject of Horace's eulogy was hardly a person of much eminence at the time of writing, though he became prominent later and is now prosopographically well endowed; above all, there is the disturbing picture of the elderly poet testily acknowledging an amorous urge and surrendering his dignity in pederastic dreams. (shrink)

This book spans roughly a century, 1860-1960, of Russian thought on the subject of God, and focuses on ten thinkers who formulated distinctive and extreme views on the subject. The connections and similarities among these highly original thinkers are admirably traced, and give an unexpected unity to the book. Bakunin, the "political anarchist," and Tolstoy, the "cultural anarchist" rejected the State, Church, and God to free men either from oppression by others or from the fear of death and oppression of (...) others. Their critique of religion had a powerful influence on the Russian Marxists. Leontyev and Rozanov, the "religious neo-conservatives" reacted against European humanism and Tolstoy's "tyranny of ethics." Both turned to the Old Testament for inspiration and support. Leontyev discovered there a faith based on the fear of God the Judge. Rozanov found a religion of joy based on the mystery of procreation and God as the loving Father. Reversing Bakunin's "if God exists, then man is a slave" the "religious existentialists," Shestov and Berdyaev, held that "if man is free, then God exists." They attempted to give a religious foundation for human freedom and values by attacking the supremacy of reason and its necessary truths. Gorky and Lunacharsky, the left wing of the Bolshevik faction, replaced God with a future mankind which is to be perfected gradually in history by the combined efforts of men. These "God-builders" were quickly silenced by Lenin. While Plekhanov remained faithful to Marx in treating religion as a historically determined illusion which will simply wither away in the socialist society, Lenin saw it as a sinister tool in the class struggle, and proclaimed total war on religion. The last chapter investigates the policies of the Soviet government toward the churches and sects, and recent interest in religious ideas among Soviet writers. Each of the mentioned thinkers receives a special section. Although some important thinkers, such as Solovyov, Dostoevsky, Fyodorov, do not get full attention, their influence is made clear. The author's style has a lucidity and simplicity which are a mark of complete mastery of subject matter.--T. D. Z. (shrink)

Having distinguished herself as a translator of Sartre and after excursions of her own into existentialist ethics and literary theory, it is not surprising that Professor Barnes was chosen by editor Walter Kaufman to write this popular survey for his series of portraits, devoted to "figures who have changed the world we live in." Most of her study is devoted to Sartre’s philosophic, literary, and political activity after 1940 when she dates his politicization. Her basic thesis throughout is that what (...) Sartre offers us is a unified and total view and that there is merely a "shift of emphasis" between Being and Nothingness and the Critique of Dialectical Reason. Central to this unified view is Sartre’s abiding faith in man’s radical freedom, i.e., his conviction that man can remake his past, whatever may have been made of it by others or himself. She feels that the "philosophy of revolution" enunciated in his essay "Materialism and Revolution" represents the nucleus of consistency in his career. Whatever change we observe in his thought centers on the moves from individualistic freedom to freedom within the group and from emphasis on consciousness and "choice of being" to "lived experience", a form of awareness which is much more opaque and self-restricting. Much of her thesis relies on the plausible claim that the interpersonal relations described in BN are predicated on the assumption of general bad faith. But they, like the scarcity discussed in the Critique, are largely superable limitations and are in fact overcome, if only temporarily, in the group-in-fusion. (shrink)

Not long ago, I received an email from a man who had been trying to get his seven-year-old son interested in science, and teach him a little bit about the workings of the brain. He had been showing his son one of those diagrams of a brain with various regions labeled as "speech center," vision center," and the like (something similar to this, I suppose), when the little boy suddenly asked, "Daddy, which part of the brain does imagination come from?". (...) It was not on the diagram, and the father, although he studied human biology at college, realized he did not know the answer. As we do these days, he got on the internet to try to find out. It was not as easy as he might have expected. "Imagination" is certainly a word that is found on a lot of web pages, and there are plenty that seem to be devoted to celebrating or promoting it, but very few of them seem to have anything at all to say about what it is, how it works, or where in the brain it might be implemented. Eventually, he found his way to this site. Even here, however, he could find no straightforward answer to his son's apparently straightforward question. (The truth is, the question is not nearly as straightforward as it appears.) He thought I might be a good a person to ask, however, and sent me an email. What follows is a lightly revised version of the reply I sent. It is not written in terms that a seven-year-old could understand (I am not clever enough to do that), but neither is it pitched at the professional, academic level of most of the material on this site. I would like to think that it answers the question (inasmuch as it can be answered in the current state of scientific knowledge) in a way that a layperson should be able to understand, and that they might then be able to explain to a curious and intelligent child. If you want to know the detailed reasons, and see the citations to the scientific literature, that justify the claims made here, you can find them in the other articles on this site.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 285 than" which is both immanent and transcendent, a kind of "coincidentia oppositorum" beyond logic and definition. It is the realm of the "person" within which, although the tragic conflict is not resolved, there arises the free self from whose non-dual perspective the unity and eternity of life are seen. Within this realm the individual gains an illumination the result of which is "amor fad," his (...) free decision to affirm his being. In this act of decision lies the "meaning" and "value" of life. The substance and point of Miss Bauer's book is to show the connection between the metaphysical ground of Simmel's concept of the tragic and its manifestations in different aspects of human experience. Her account is especially interesting in her chapter on the "tragic opposition" in which as an example of a tragic personality she cites Socrates who, by his refusal to flee from his prison, freely embraced his fate and, by choosing to die, confirmed his decisive, binding truth that the heavenly powers remain silent to the questions asked by a doubting and despairing humanity. His act declares that the individual must really stand alone in the world, taking counsel only from himself. Miss Bauer's book is written with a sympathetic understanding of Simmel's philosophy. By opening our eyes to the significant in human existence she succeeds in showing file relevance of his thought to our time. RIA STAVR1DES Vassar College Dialogo con Maurizio Blondel. By Michele Federico Sciacca. (Milano: Carlo Marzorati Editore, 1962. Pp. 159. L. 1300.) Sciacca has gathered here various articles which he had written about Blondel as well as new notes about this French thinker. Blondel struggled against the cult of science seeking to vindicate man's religious needs. Man longs for an end which transcends the natural order. Hence philosophy cannot ignore religion which points to a supernatural human destiny. According to Blondel, God is the only Word which answers the search of man and makes his action both fruitful and progressive. PAUL T. FUHRMANN Columbia Theological Seminary Essays in Ontology. By E. G. Allaire, M. Brodbeck, R. Grossman, H. Hochberg, R. G. Turnbull. Vol. I, Iowa Publications in Philosophy. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963. Pp. 216.) Essays in Ontology is the introductory volume of a new series of monographs to be published by the Department of Philosophy at the University of Iowa. The first volume, as its title indicates, is a collection of essays whose authors are closely affiliated with the Iowa Philosophy Department, being faculty members there now (Allaire and Turnbull) or former students (Hochberg, Grossman, and Brodbeck). Considered as a representative display of talent, the collection is somewhat unbalanced, since twelve of the fourteen papers are by three of the contributors, Allaire, Grossman, and Hochberg, while the other two are contributed by Brodbeck and Turnbull. It is also a matter of some disappointment that eleven of the fourteen papers have seen the light of print elsewhere; although this feeling is somewhat offset by the impact of sustained inquiry into one philosophical problem which the papers make when brought together in this way. The three new papers are "Particulars and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 77 as indicated, makes a highly convincing case, if not for his thesis, at least for his approach. We need more such research. The history of philosophy must be more than the history of philosophies. But is a method which excludes subjective elements and treats ideologies only in function of material factors really total? Refusing to admit the "idealistic" notion of a kind of freedom, of (...) human self-possession, independent not of history (of which it is a part) but of historical determinism, the materialist is driven into rationalizations as baroque as those of the idealist he fights. The substantial uses of the materialist approach, which S~ve makes clear, have been too much ignored; and ideological interpretations tend, as he says, to confuse issues too uncomfortable to face. But materialism too has its ideological confusions which cannot be discerned by autocriticism alone. For who is to see whether the tree continues to be when there's no one about in the quad? EUGEN WEBER University of California, Los Angeles THE PHILOSOPHYOF CHARLES SECRETAN 1815.1895 The philosophy of Seer&an is still important. It best illustrates the nature of the thought of Romanic French-speaking Switzerland in its perpetual attempt to keep up-to-date and to combine science (as exact knowledge) with religion (that is, Christianity). To this day Romanic Swiss thought is a strange mixture of science, speculation, civics, democracy, pedagogics, and traditional Christianity. We find all these elements in Charles Secr6tan, but his thought is also important when taken by itself. Moreover, it illustrates what some scholars call the spiritual greatness of the nineteenth century. Charles Secr6tan was born in 1815 at Lausanne. As a child he was precocious. At the age of four he read short stories fluently. In his youth he was fond of books and had a vivid sense of the beauty of nature. His father was a magistrate tending to Voltairian skepticism. His mother was a devout woman but very reserved and of few words. Charles studied law at the Academy (University) of his city. He came to accept the political liberalism of that day but also underwent the influence of the current religious Rdveil. This was an individualistic awakening of personal Christianity in opposition to the dead orthodoxy and church-conformity of the previous century. In other words, Secrdtan came to believe that adherence to a religion should involve something personally felt, rather than a mere following of the mores of the community. Between 1835 and 1840, he spent some semesters in Munich, studying under Schelling. Later he was to insist upon the originality of his philosophy and its independence of that of his early teacher. In 1837, Seer&an founded the Swiss Review. The next year he was called to teach 78 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Philosophy at the Lausanne Academy. He was suspended by the radical revolution (a sort of demagogery) of 1845. In 1850 he was called to Neuch~ttel and in 1866 recalled to Lausanne where he died in 1895--exactly eighty years old. In the Lausanne Academy, Secr6tan had as a colleague his old friend Alexander Vinet (1797-1847). He found in Vinet a religious force which uplifted his spirit. Vinet was a literary critic, a poet and a professor of the art of preaching, while Secr6tan was a philosopher. Yet Secr6tan owed to Vinet the conviction that no religious doctrine is worthy of acceptance unless it possesses a moral value in itself and in relation to man. The philosophical career of Secr6tan is characterized by three distinct stages (metaphysical, ethical, and sociological) each of which finds expression in an important work: La Philosophie de la Libertd (1849), Le Principe de la Morale (1883), and La Civilisation et la Croyance (1887). We shall therefore consider most briefly Secr~tan's metaphysics, ethics, and sociology. Metaphysics. The starting point of Secr~tan is his contrast of the domain of the conscience (wherein we find being) with the domain of external experience (phenomena). "All our ideas of being come from the fact that [when we affirm something to be] we mean that this something [which is] is analogous to that which we think of when we say 'I am' " (Philosophie de... (shrink)

Although Marx dubbed landowners one of the ‘three great classes’ of modern society, the most prominent Marxian and socialist thinkers of capitalism and land over the past century – from Lefebvre to Massey to Harvey – have implicitly or explicitly argued that landowners are not capitalism’s ‘third class’, and that the social relations of land are marginal or contingent to the mode of production as a whole. Through assessing the work of Marxist geographers, political economists, value-form theorists, and others who (...) have dismissed the class-status of landowners and blurred the line between ground rent and interest, this article argues that the theory of the landowning class is fundamental to the understanding of the totality of capitalist social relations, as well as to developing more incisive analyses of struggles around housing, land, and movement today. (shrink)

Under the influence of recurrent deleterious mutation and selection, asexual and sexual populations reach a deterministic equilibrium with individuals carrying 0,1,2,. . . harmful mutations. When a favourable mutation (aA) occurs in an asexual population it will usually occur in an individual who has one or more (k) deleterious mutations. Muller's ratchet then applies as A will thereafter never occur in an individual with less than k mutations. If the selective advantage of A is less than the selective disadvantage of (...) k harmful mutations then A will not spread. If it is greater it may spread carrying k deleterious mutations to fixation. Sexual populations are not affected in this way. A will spread through the population experiencing genomes with 0,1,2,. . . deleterious mutations in accordance with the deterministic equilibrium. (shrink)

There is evidence that asexual reproduction has a long-term disadvantage when compared to sexual reproduction. This disadvantage is usually assumed to arise from the more efficient incorporation of advantageous mutations by sexual populations. We consider here the effect on asexual and sexual populations of changes in the fitness of harmful mutations. It is shown that the re-establishment of equilibrium following environmental change is generally faster in sexual populations, and that the mutational load experienced by the sexual population can be (...) significantly less during this period than that experienced by an asexual one. Changes in the fitness of harmful mutations may therefore impose a greater long-term disadvantage on asexual populations than those which are sexual. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXII, Number 1, April 1996, pp. 193-202 Why Hume Wasn't an Atheist: A Reply to Andre BERYL LOGAN In a recent issue of Hume Studies,1 Shane Andre argues that, as Hume's position on theism can be read primarily from Philo's position in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and since Philo's position in the Dialogues is one of "limited theism," Hume was also a "limited theist" and (...) therefore not an atheist. According to Andre, a "limited theist" is one like Epicurus, "who denied, not that the Gods exist, but that they intervene in human affairs" and, he continues, "...at least in philosophical circles, the term 'atheist' is generally restricted to people who disbelieve any form of theism, and this is the sense in which I propose to enquire whether Hume was an atheist" (142). Andre's claim then is that Hume is not an atheist in this latter sense, but is a limited theist in the former sense. This is shown in "three major objections to standard theism" in the Dialogues: those addressing the Argument from Design and the problem of evil, as well as the lack of debate on whether or not God exists. Philo's criticisms of the Argument from Design amount to the claim that, "not that there is no God, but that, if there is a God," empirical evidence cannot show that God has any of the traditional characteristics of wisdom, power or goodness. The "proper conclusion" of Philo's argument from evil does not concern God's existence, but establishes that God is "limited in some important respect." Philo's "limited theism" is expressed in his ambivalent attitude toward Cleanthes' Argument from Design in Part 12 ("that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human Beryl Logan is at the Department of Philosophy, Scarborough College, University of Toronto, 1265 Military Trail, Scarborough, Ontario MlC 1A4, Canada, email: logan@lake.'scar.utoronto.ca 194 Beryl Logan intelligence"). In sum, Philo and Cleanthes never debate God's existence, and they accept a limited Deity, therefore they hold positions of limited theism, therefore Philo is not an atheist. While I agree with Andre's conclusion that Hume is not an atheist, I will show in this paper first, that the interpretation which provides his means for arriving at this conclusion is not consistent with the text and faces a number of difficulties, and second, that the sense in which Hume is a limited theist has to do with the limitations of human reason and experience, and not with God's limited nature. My criticisms of Andre's position will be directed at three points in his argument: (1) his claim for Philo's theism based on Philo's lack of scepticism about God's existence; (2) what he regards to be the "proper conclusion" (153) to the problem of evil, as this directly influences his view of Philo's scepticism and the nature of the Deity; and (3) his view that Philo's theism is to be found in his acceptance of the Argument from Design (Philo's limited theism). My arguments will centre upon the "suspense of judgement," and where and how this.mental stance is used by Hume in the arguments of the Dialogues.2 Scepticism about God's Existence Andre claims that the arguments in the Dialogues are directed only to God's nature and do not address God's existence in spite of the fact that Cleanthes concludes his Argument from Design by claiming that the data in the world provide conclusive analogical support for the existence and (human-like) intelligence of the (traditional) Deity.3 Cleanthes' anthropomorphic Argument from Design purports to "prove" that the world has an intelligent divine designer just like machines have intelligent human designers and the only difference between the causes based on the effects is one of degree and not one of kind: the designer of the world is far grander than the designer of a computer because the world is more complex than a computer. I would urge, though, that Philo's scepticism is directed at both aspects of the Argument... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXII, Number 1, April 1996, pp. 193-202 Why Hume Wasn't an Atheist: A Reply to Andre BERYL LOGAN In a recent issue of Hume Studies,1 Shane Andre argues that, as Hume's position on theism can be read primarily from Philo's position in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and since Philo's position in the Dialogues is one of "limited theism," Hume was also a "limited theist" and (...) therefore not an atheist. According to Andre, a "limited theist" is one like Epicurus, "who denied, not that the Gods exist, but that they intervene in human affairs" and, he continues, "...at least in philosophical circles, the term 'atheist' is generally restricted to people who disbelieve any form of theism, and this is the sense in which I propose to enquire whether Hume was an atheist" (142). Andre's claim then is that Hume is not an atheist in this latter sense, but is a limited theist in the former sense. This is shown in "three major objections to standard theism" in the Dialogues: those addressing the Argument from Design and the problem of evil, as well as the lack of debate on whether or not God exists. Philo's criticisms of the Argument from Design amount to the claim that, "not that there is no God, but that, if there is a God," empirical evidence cannot show that God has any of the traditional characteristics of wisdom, power or goodness. The "proper conclusion" of Philo's argument from evil does not concern God's existence, but establishes that God is "limited in some important respect." Philo's "limited theism" is expressed in his ambivalent attitude toward Cleanthes' Argument from Design in Part 12 ("that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human Beryl Logan is at the Department of Philosophy, Scarborough College, University of Toronto, 1265 Military Trail, Scarborough, Ontario MlC 1A4, Canada, email: logan@lake.'scar.utoronto.ca 194 Beryl Logan intelligence"). In sum, Philo and Cleanthes never debate God's existence, and they accept a limited Deity, therefore they hold positions of limited theism, therefore Philo is not an atheist. While I agree with Andre's conclusion that Hume is not an atheist, I will show in this paper first, that the interpretation which provides his means for arriving at this conclusion is not consistent with the text and faces a number of difficulties, and second, that the sense in which Hume is a limited theist has to do with the limitations of human reason and experience, and not with God's limited nature. My criticisms of Andre's position will be directed at three points in his argument: (1) his claim for Philo's theism based on Philo's lack of scepticism about God's existence; (2) what he regards to be the "proper conclusion" (153) to the problem of evil, as this directly influences his view of Philo's scepticism and the nature of the Deity; and (3) his view that Philo's theism is to be found in his acceptance of the Argument from Design (Philo's limited theism). My arguments will centre upon the "suspense of judgement," and where and how this.mental stance is used by Hume in the arguments of the Dialogues.2 Scepticism about God's Existence Andre claims that the arguments in the Dialogues are directed only to God's nature and do not address God's existence in spite of the fact that Cleanthes concludes his Argument from Design by claiming that the data in the world provide conclusive analogical support for the existence and (human-like) intelligence of the (traditional) Deity.3 Cleanthes' anthropomorphic Argument from Design purports to "prove" that the world has an intelligent divine designer just like machines have intelligent human designers and the only difference between the causes based on the effects is one of degree and not one of kind: the designer of the world is far grander than the designer of a computer because the world is more complex than a computer. I would urge, though, that Philo's scepticism is directed at both aspects of the Argument... (shrink)

In works of literary fiction, it is a part of the fiction that the words of the text are being recounted by some work-internal 'voice': the literary narrator. One can ask similarly whether the story in movies is told in sights and sounds by a work-internal subjectivity that orchestrates them: a cinematic narrator. George M. Wilson argues that movies do involve a fictional recounting (an audio-visual narration ) in terms of the movie's sound and image track. Viewers are usually prompted (...) to imagine seeing the items and events in the movie's fictional world and to imagine hearing the associated fictional sounds. However, it is much less clear that the cinematic narration must be imagined as the product of some kind of 'narrator' - of a work-internal agent of the narration. Wilson goes on to examine the further question whether viewers imagine seeing the fictional world face-to-face or whether they imagine seeing it through some kind of work-internal mediation . It is a key contention of this book that only the second of these alternatives allows one to give a coherent account of what we do and do not imagine about what we are seeing on the screen. Having provided a partial account of the foundations of film narration, the final chapters explore the ways in which certain complex strategies of cinematic narration are executed in three exemplary films: David Fincher's Fight Club , von Sternberg's The Scarlet Empress , and the Coen brothers' The Man Who Wasn't There. (shrink)

Sustained attention, a key cognitive skill that improves during childhood and adolescence, tends to be worse in some emotional and behavioural disorders. Sustained attention is typically studied in non-affective task contexts; here, we used a novel task to index performance in affective versus neutral contexts across adolescence (N = 465; ages 11–18). We asked whether: (i) performance would be worse in negative versus neutral task contexts; (ii) performance would improve with age; (iii) affective interference would be greater in younger adolescents; (...) (iv) adolescents at risk for depression and higher in anxiety would show overall worse performance; and (v) would show differential performance in negative contexts. Results indicated that participants performed more poorly in negative contexts and showed age-related performance improvements. Those at risk of depression performed more poorly than those at lower risk. However, there was no difference between groups as a result of affective context. For anxiety there was no difference in performance as a function of severity. However, those with higher anxiety showed less variance in their reaction times to negative stimuli than those with lower anxiety. One interpretation is that moderate levels of emotional arousal associated with anxiety make individuals less susceptible to the distracting effects of negative stimuli. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Standing at the Intersections: Navigating Life as a Black Intersex ManSean Saifa WallAs I sit down to write this narrative, my mind is reflecting on the past year. This year has seen numerous protests against state–sanctioned violence with the declaration that “Black Lives Matter”. As a Black intersex man, I have witnessed the impact of state–sanctioned violence on my family and my community, both from the police state and (...) medical community. I charge the police state and the medical community with state– sanctioned violence: Each targets non–normative bodies—the former through incarceration and execution, and the latter by means of surgical and hormonal intervention. As a Black intersex man, I stand at the intersection bearing witness to how this violence has incarcerated my friends and loved ones as well as being subjected to medically unnecessary surgical intervention. Although this is where I stand now, both socially and politically, I have not always existed here.I was born in the winter of 1978 at Columbia–Presbyterian Hospital in New York City. I was the youngest of five children and one of three children in my family who were born with an intersex trait now known as androgen insensitivity syndrome (AIS). At the time, AIS was referred to as “testicular [End Page 117] feminization syndrome.” Upon receiving my medical records years later at the age of twenty–five, I noticed scribbling and a barrage of notes indicating the process by which the doctors assigned my gender as female. Although I had ambiguous genitalia, which caused some initial confusion among the doctors, XY chromosomes were not enough for me to be raised as male. My mother was told I would be raised as a girl and, according to the medical records, “function as such.”Unlike my sisters who were also born with AIS, my mom was not swayed by the surgical recommendations doctors made about my body. As a matter of protocol, my sisters’ gonads were removed in infancy, however, my mom made the decision that my testes would remain with me until they had to be removed.Because of intense pain in my groin area, my testicles were removed when I was thirteen years old. The pain that I felt following the surgery was perhaps the worst pain that I have experienced in my entire life. After surgery, my pediatrician prescribed estrogen and Provera as a hormonal replacement regimen. Fatty deposits changed the shape and contours of my face. Once robust and chiseled thighs now harbored cellulite. The beginnings of facial hair and prominent body hair became wispy and nonexistent. What was hard and defined became soft.At no point did anyone ask me what I wanted to do with my body.I actually missed the effects of my natural testosterone such as a deepening voice, increased hair and muscle mass; when I asked if I could take both testosterone and estrogen after surgery, my mother remarked, “You would look too weird.”The hormone therapy was coupled with intense social conditioning. I feel as if the social conditioning for young women raised with AIS is suffocating. When doctors prescribed hormones for me to take, my mother constantly reminded me how “beautiful” the little yellow pills would make me. As a means of reassurance, my pediatrician told my mom that “a lot of fashion models” have AIS and that I would most certainly be beautiful. In our dominant US culture, gender norms can already be oppressive, but for women with AIS, there is the impact of gender norms and the underlying fear that women with AIS are not really women since they have XY chromosomes. I did not succumb to the pressure to be more feminine, but actually gravitated toward masculinity. Before transitioning to live as a man, I considered myself a butch woman. When I came out of the closet at fourteen years old and presented as a masculine young woman, I never felt safe. Because I dated women who were more feminine than I, my relationship with these women seemed threatening to men who repeatedly reminded me through harassment and threats that “I was not a man.” Of course, I wasn’t trying to be a... (shrink)

Should this book be summarized in a single quip it would be in Albert Einstein’s remark “there is a natural order in the world.” Author Gregory Zuckerman patiently portrays the logical steps that t...

This essay is an exploration of how to conceptualize the so-called scientific revolution. A central figure in this discussion is Thomas Kuhn, whose Structure of Scientific Revolutions has shaped much recent discussion of scientific change in the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. It is argued that the simple model of a revolution—an old orthodoxy, followed by a period of instability until it is replaced by a new orthodoxy—does not actually represent how change happened in scientific thought in this crucial period. (...) The essay then suggests a different model for understanding change in the period, the Protestant Reformation. Just as in the Reformation the Catholic Church persisted, so Aristotelian natural philosophy persists through much of the so-called scientific revolution. And just as there were multiple sects of protestants who coexisted with one another, there were many alternatives to the dominant Aristotelianism that coexisted and fought as much with one another as with Aristotelian natural philosophy. Without the master narrative provided by the theme of the scientific revolution, the writing of the history of this period is going to be a very open-ended process. (shrink)

Recently, there has been an increased interest in folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility from both philosophers and psychologists. We aim to extend our understanding of folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility using an individual differences approach. Building off previous research suggesting that there are systematic differences in folks’ philosophically relevant intuitions, we present new data indicating that the personality trait extraversion predicts, to a significant extent, those who have compatibilist versus incompatibilist intuitions. We argue that (...) identifying groups of people who have specific and diverse intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility offers the possibility for theoretical advancement in philosophy and psychology, and may in part explain why some perennial philosophical debates have proven intractable. (shrink)

Context: There is a growing recognition in consciousness science of the need for rigorous methods for obtaining accurate and detailed phenomenological reports of lived experience, i.e., descriptions of experience provided by the subject living them in the “first-person.” Problem: At the moment although introspection and debriefing interviews are sometimes used to guide the design of scientific studies of the mind, explicit description and evaluation of these methods and their results rarely appear in formal scientific discourse. Method: The recent publication (...) of an edited book of papers dedicated to the exploration of first-and second-person methods, Ten Years of Viewing from Within: The Legacy of Francisco Varela, serves as a starting point for a discussion of how these methods could be integrated into the growing discipline of consciousness science. We complement a brief review of the book with a critical analysis of the major pilot studies in Varela’s neurophenomenology, a research program that was explicitly devised to integrate disciplined experiential methods with the latest advances in neuroscience. Results: The book is a valuable resource for those who are interested in impressive recent advances in first- and second-person methods, as applied to the phenomenology of lived experience. However, our review of the neurophenomenology literature concludes that there is as yet no convincing example of these specialized techniques being used in combination with standard behavioral and neuroscientific approaches in consciousness science to produce results that could not have also been achieved by simpler methods of introspective reporting. Implications: The end of behaviorism and the acceptance of verbal reports of conscious experience have already enabled the beginning of a science of consciousness. It can only be of benefit if new first- and second-person methods become well-known across disciplines. Constructivist content: Constructivism has long been interested in the role of the observer in the constitution of our sense of reality, so these developments in the science of consciousness may open new avenues of constructivist research. More specifically, one of the ways in which the insights from first- and second-person methods are being validated is by recursively applying the methods to themselves; a practical application of an epistemological move that will be familiar to constructivists from the second-order cybernetics tradition. (shrink)

A medical centre is an institution established for a specific purpose: to facilitate the health and health-related welfare of the medical centre's patients. Within this institution, there are a variety of professionals who act and interact to serve this purpose. Of particular interest is the interaction between physician and nurse. Generally, the nurse is thought to be under a certain obligation to implement a physician's orders unless there is good reason not to do so. This qualifier places a (...) conflicting obligation upon the nurse not to implement some physician orders. How should a judgement about which orders there is 'good reason' not to implement be made? I propose to approach this question through an analysis of the obligation the nurse has to implement the order of a physician, and the conditions under which the order does not pose such obligations. This analysis will consist of an examination of the obligation in terms of the purposive authority of the physician. For example, in the context of the medical centre, the physician's medical training qualifies her as best able to make determinations of what treatment would promote the patient's health. However, this purpose not only serves as the basis of the physician's authority, but also serves as a limitation upon the physician's authority (for example, an order which would harm the patient would not reflect the purpose for which the physician has been given authority). Thus, a philosophical investigation into the nature of the obligation to implement a physician's orders can help to clarify those occasions when a nurse should not implement an order. (shrink)

Should this book be summarized in a single quip it would be in Albert Einstein’s remark “there is a natural order in the world.” Author Gregory Zuckerman patiently portrays the logical steps that t...

In recent ”secular’ Epistemology, much attention has been paid to formulating an ”anti-luck’ or ”safety’ condition; it is now widely held that such a condition is an essential part of any satisfactory post-Gettier reflection on the nature of knowledge. In this paper, I explain the safety condition as it has emerged and then explore some implications of and for it arising from considering the God issue. It looks at the outset as if safety might be ”good news’ for a view (...) characteristic of Reformed Epistemology, viz. the view that if Theism is true, many philosophically unsophisticated believers probably know that it’s true. A sub-conclusion of my paper though suggests that as safety does not by itself turn true belief into knowledge, the recent focus on it is not quite such good news for Reformed Epistemologists as they may have hoped: it’s not that safety provides a new route by which they can reach this sort of conclusion. But safety is still good news for their view at least in the sense that there is no reason arising from considering it to count these philosophically unsophisticated believers as not knowing that there’s a God. I conclude by reflecting that good news for Reformed Epistemology is perhaps bad news for the discipline of Philosophy of Religion more generally, as there’s a possible ”reflection destroys knowledge’-implication to be drawn. Those who have been led to their religious beliefs in at least some philosophically unsophisticated ways seem to enjoy much safer religious beliefs than those who have been led to their religious beliefs by philosophical reflection, so the discipline as a whole will be adversely affected if safety is eventually accorded the role of a necessary condition for knowledge. (shrink)

In this book we provide a collection of writing by eminent scholars in our field, in which we asked them to engage with the thoughts of many of the philosophers and theorists who have influenced thinking and practice about young children and their care and education. Some readers may feel their favourite philosopher or theorist has been omitted or been given little space but we do not claim the Handbook is comprehensive – there is always more to say, more (...) to write about. Further, it would be impossible to provide a real introduction to the vast and exciting discipline of Philosophy, which includes a number of different areas of study. (shrink)

The article consists of four chapters taken from a comprehensive study on Wagner.The first chapter discusses the character of the man Wagner. The author undertakes a social analysis which reveals Wagner to be a bourgeois figure who is no longer able to fulfill the monadological claims of bourgeois society, and who actually deserts to the ruling powers while seemingly in conflict with the society of his day. This analysis is made particularly clear through a study of Wagner's anti-Semitism.The following sections, (...) only excerpts of which appear in the present essay, study the relationship between Wagner’s social character and the technical structure of his works, using concepts such as the conductor- composer and the,,gestural type“ of composition. This approach involves minute analyses of certain essential elements of Wagner's technique : the leitmotif, the infinite („unendliche“) melody, his harmonization and scoring.From the principle of Wagner's instrumentation the author derives the concept of phantasmagoria, which is the subject of the sixth chapter of the larger wrork (reprinted here). Phantasmagoria is defined as the aesthetic phenomenon that tends to hide the mode of its genesis and to appear as „nature“.The seventh and eighth chapters have not been included. They deal with the notion of the music drama as the phantasmagoric form, developed primarily from Wagner's theoretical writings, and with the mythical element in his work. The mythical in Wagner is two-sided, for it seeks to interpret the unconscious and in turn to dissolve the real into the unconscious.The two final chapters are devoted to the philosophy inherent in the works of Wagner and to a philosophical interpretation of his work. Chapter nine discusses the Ring from the standpoint of the betrayal of the revolution by the „rebel“. The canon is given by analysis of Wotan as the unity of Impotent old god and beggar. Chapter ten describes Wagner's pessimism. It shows the fundamental difference between Wagner and Schopenhauer, analyzes the Wagnerian concept of the nil as that of the chimaerical, and concludes by „rescuing“ his nihilism as the form adopted by Utopia in the early period of bourgeois decay.L'article se compose de quatre chapitres extraits d’un vaste travail consacré à Richard Wagner.Le premier chapitre étudie la personnalité de Wagner : son caractère est défini comme étant celui du bourgeois désormais incapable de répondre aux exigences monadologiques de la société bourgeoise. L’apparence d’un conflit avec la société masque la soumission de fait aux puissances établies : c’est ce qui est étudié de près dans l’analyse de l’antisémitisme wagnérien.Les chapitres suivants, desquels la présente publication n’offre que des extraits, établissent d’abord — grâce aux concepts du chef d’orchestre et du mode „gestique“ de la composition — le rapport entre le caractère social de Wagner et la complexité technique de son oeuvre. Viennent ensuite des analyses détaillées de quelques éléments essentiels du mode wagnérien de composition, tels que la technique du leitmotiv, de la mélodie infinie, de l’harmonique et de l’instrumentation.Le concept de la fantasmagorie est déduit du principe de l’instrumentation wagnérienne : voilà le thème central du sixième chapitre que notre texte présente, de nouveau, intégralement. La fantasmagorie est définie comme le phénomène esthétique qui renie le mode de sa production.Les chapitres VII et VIII encore, manquent dans la présente publication. Ils traitent du concept du drame musical en tant que forme fantasmagorique. Ce sont surtout les écrits théoriques de Wagner qui servent à développer ce concept. On en vient à examiner l’élément mythique de l’oeuvre wagnérienne — élément équivoque en ce qu’il tend à interpréter l’inconscient en même temps qu’il voudrait le dissoudre dans un inconscient plus profond encore.Les deux derniers chapitres étudient la philosophie inhérente de Wagner, et tâchent de donner une interprétation philosophique de son oeuvre. Le neuvième chapitre donne une analyse du „Ring“ — la trahison de la révolution par le „rebelle“. Le „canon“ du raisonnement est, ici, la figure de Wotan — à la fois vieux dieu rendu impuissant et mendiant. Le chapitre X décrit le pessimisme wagnérien. Il expose la différence fondamentale entre Wagner et Schopenhauer, la reconstruction méthodique du concept wagnérien du néant montre que ce néant est chimérique. La conclusion est, en quelque sorte, une réhabilitation du nihilisme wagnérien en ce que ce nihilisme fut la forme que revêtit l’utopie au début de la décadence bourgeoise. (shrink)

Despite the efforts of Bosanquet, Muirhead, Basch, and many others, it is still frequently stated or implied, in both popular and scholarly literature, that Hegel constructed his philosophy of the State with an eye to pleasing the reactionary and conservative rulers of Prussia in his day, and condoned, supported, and, through his teaching, became partly responsible for some of the most criticized features in “Prussianism” and even of present-day National-Socialism.5 Ijn this article I propose to give reasons for denying that (...) Hegel the man is justly accused of servility to the Prussian Government, and that there is any warrant in the text of his Philosophie des Rechts for the charge that Hegel the philosopher was an exponent of “Prussianism” and “ frightfulness.”. (shrink)